Humanizing Madness

Denying a causally significant Ëœmental' factor in the practice of behaviorist psychiatry has become a self-made rule in contemporary psychiatric practice. The denial is in fact so dogged and ingrained that any mention of a non-material Ëœmental' component is certain to invoke either indignation or, more commonly, ridicule. But can hard-shelled materialism clinging to the interaction of matter and energy alone account for Ëœnormal' and Ëœabnormal' mental activity without compromising scientific accuracy and logical soundness? Dr. Niall McLaren's answer is ËœNO!' In his book Humanizing Madness, the seasoned Aussie psychiatrist seriously questions the legitimacy of the behaviorist-dominated discipline of contemporary psychiatry. Dr. McLaren's challenge, if got enough attention, may cause a radical shift in our concept of human mind, consciousness, behavior, and the criteria for normality and abnormal mental states.

Humanizing Madness not only unveils the Ëœreal' causes that made behaviorism the rule rather than exception in psychiatry, but also pokes at the unscientific ruling out of other mental theories, which of course had their own weaknesses like behaviorism but failed to hold the center of the stage due to the Ëœmaterialist charm' of the behaviorist approach. As Dr. McLaren shows, psychiatry has always been, and still is, in great need of a sound scientific theory. The treatment it offers at present are as arbitrary as anything and the psychological disorders themselves are loosely classified and poorly understood, much more lingering as presumption than objective verification. Psychodynamics, magic, and functionalism are no better than dead horses when it comes to conceptual underpinnings of psychiatric treatment of disorders. Where else can we look for help? Dr. McLaren would propose a revision of our concepts of Ëœmaterial' and Ëœmental'.

His proposed model of the working of mind emerges from his theoretical approach toward mind's function: the biocognitive theory of mind. Maintaining the analogy of human mind as a computer, this model includes the processes involved in mental activity as a causally significant part of the mind's constitution. They cannot be reduced to atoms or photons but their existence as scientifically valid entities can hardly be questioned. Now this may throw the reductionist out of his easy chair but then again, how can we account for non-material stimuli influencing one's behavior without involving these very mental processes. Surely, it's time for the reductions too to reconsider things in the light of science and philosophy. Humanizing Madness just does that: pointing out reification as something open to question and very much in need of revision.

ISBN: 1932690395

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http://www.amazon.com/Humanizing-Madness-Psychiatry-Cognitive-Neuroscien...

Author Website

http://futurepsychiatry.com/