Minneapolis Bridge disaster most likely caused by design flaw

January 15th 2008 A design error led to undersized gusset plates used in the Interstate 35-W bridge in Minneapolis, which collapsed last year, killing 13 people and injuring 100, the National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday

The National Transportation Safety Board today issued a safety recommendation that addresses a design issue with the I-35W bridge that collapsed into the Mississippi river on August 1, 2007. In this accident, approximately 1,000 feet of the deck truss fell into the river, and as a result, 13 people died and 145 people were injured.
The recommendation is made to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and states: "for all non-load-path- redundant steel truss bridges within the National Bridge Inventory, require that bridge owners conduct load capacity calculations to verify that the stress levels on all structural elements, including gusset plates, remain within applicable design requirements, whenever planned modifications or operational changes may significantly increase stresses."
"Although the Board's investigation is still on-going and no determination of probable cause has been reached, interim findings in the investigation have revealed a safety issue that warrants attention," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "During the wreckage recovery, investigators discovered that gusset plates at eight different joint locations in the main center span were fractured. The Board, with assistance from the FHWA, conducted a thorough review of the design of the bridge, with an emphasis on the design of the gusset plates. This review discovered that the original design process of the I-35W bridge led to a serious error in sizing some of the gusset plates in the main truss."
Undersized gusset plates were found at 8 of the 112 nodes (joints) on the main trusses of the bridge. These 16 gusset plates (2 at each node) were roughly half the thickness required and too thin to provide the margin of safety expected in a properly designed bridge.
The Safety Board emphasizes that there is no evidence to suggest that the deficiencies in the various design review procedures associated with this bridge are widespread or even go beyond this particular bridge. In fact, this is the only bridge failure of this type of which the Safety Board is aware.
"The Safety Board has issued this recommendation, at this time, to ensure that the original design calculations for other bridges of this type have been made correctly, before any planned modification or operational changes are accomplished affecting such bridges and before any additional stresses are placed on them," Rosenker said.